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Javier González López  
Bosnia and Herzegovina: a Case Study for the 
Unfinished EU Agenda in the Western Balkans 
“If there is ever another war in Europe, 
 it will come out of some damned silly thing in the Balkans” 
Otto Von Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire, 1897 
1. Introduction 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) provides a strategic case study to examine 
the engagement of the European Union in the Western Balkans. In 
February 2018, together with Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo, BiH was given 
a European perspective with accession negotiations moving forward. In 
the words of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, it is “merit-based, each under different conditions 
and at its own pace, but with a strong commitment on the part of the EU 
to make this goal credible and finally become true.”1  The accession 
negotiations are a promising development for a region that needs to leave 
behind tumultuous conflicts, cycles of external and internal oppression, 
dysfunctional state structures, underdevelopment, as well as an 
impoverished citizenry and issues of depopulation. 
 
1  Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the European 
Parliament Plenary Session on the Western Balkan Strategy, online at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39451/speech- 
high-representativevic%20 e-president-federica-mogherini-european-parliament-
plenary_en. Last accessed 18 July 2018. 
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However, the new European perspective is only the beginning of a long 
and challenging task for the country. For years, the EU has been involved 
in a variety of interventions within BiH with mixed results.2 Past failures 
can be primarily found with governance structures which prevented 
essential reforms from being implemented at the national level, and the 
limits imposed by prior actions, including the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (DPA). This has been viewed as preventing to facilitate 
transformation of BiH into a functional state.3 This Discussion Paper 
intends to address and examine these failures. Furthermore, the role 
of EU instruments, including the Stability and Association Agreement 
(SAA), the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), and the 
European Perspective in the Strategy for the Western Balkans in 
enhancing the rule of law and respect for human rights will be explored.  
2.  Academic Perspectives on BiH, the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, the Rule of Law and Human Rights 
A solution to BiH’s quandary includes two key elements: first, 
pressure from the international community, and second, the need to 
reform the basic framework that fails to provide functional and 
inclusive institutions within the country. 4  In her legal analysis, 
 
2  Ana E. Juncos, 11/01/2005, “The EU's Post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: (Re) Integrating the Balkans and/or (Re) Inventing the EU?” in: 
Southeast European Politics, 6 (2): 88-108. 
3  Ibid; David Harland, 07/2017, “Never again: International intervention in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, online at: http://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ 
 Never-again-International-intervention-in-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina.pdf.  
Last accessed 26 July 2018. 
4  Based on a review of related literature authored by the following have been made: 
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, “The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal 
Analysis”, in Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosni-Herzegovina, 
Routledge, 2018: 73-104.; Nedim Kulenovic and Jasmin Hasic, “The Influences of 
Dayton Agreement on Institutions: Legislatures in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in: 
Ludovica Benedizione and Valentina Rita Scotti, ed., Proceedings of the Conference 
Twenty Years after Dayton, The Constitutional Transition of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 2016: 61-80; Maria Dicosola, “Ethnic Federalism and Political Rights 
of the Others in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, ibid.: 95-112. 
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Fionnauala Ni Aolain proposed an approach that engages the 
international community as a key actor for reform. She asserted that 
the DPA, as a transitionary structure, could lead to a more sustainable 
solution and that a renegotiation of the peace agreement, in light of its 
issues is undesirable in the short term.5   
Simultaneously, Maria Dicosola emphasized the importance of the 
role of the international community in that regard. She identified 
international intervention as the main driver of change, including the 
Council of Europe pressing the parliament of BiH to reform the 
system of ethnic federalism, as well as the Venice Commission 
welcoming the introduction of a rotation among constituent peoples 
within the Presidency.6  
Finally, Kulenović and Hasić tackled the role of the EU integration in 
BiH. They see European integration as an important driving factor for 
reforms. However, here the focus lies on “conditionality”.7 The shape 
of the Copenhagen criteria, which Dicosola also noted as critically 
important, was set out during the European Council in Copenhagen in 
19938 as the fundamental conditions for Eastern European countries 
to join the EU. They include a focus on the commitment to respect 
the democratic values of the EU as well as the commitment of 
promoting those values.9  
  
 
5  Aolain (1998). 
6  Dicosola (2016). 
7  Kulenović and Hasić (2016). 
8   European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the 
Presidency, online at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf 
 Last accessed 15 July 2018. 
9  European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the 
Presidency, online at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf 
 Last accessed 15 July 2018. 
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3. Overview of the History of BiH 
Europe’s history creates a myriad of crossroads, cultural and political 
hot spots and heavily disputed territories, changing borders as well as 
identities. It is possible to note the same about the history of BiH and 
the wider region. A narrative of self-serving political ends underlines 
the history of BiH. 10 An anachronistic approach that forces BiH’s 
complex past into a modern and distorting interpretation of its history, 
where the establishment of official ethnic identities, expansionist or 
totalitarian projects, moving borders and impositions can be seen.  
While the past can be brushed aside, and often is in modern politics, 
the past cannot be forgotten, it is always present in the present, and 
very much so in politics. Especially in BiH the past still greatly 
impacts the formation of the government and the society in general. 
While, societies have to look back into the past, especially in a place 
like Europe, they have to do so even more in the Balkans. All past 
choices and decisions, condition the present and in effect create a path 
dependence that limits and guides what reforms may be introduced, 
having an influence in their effectiveness and durability. For BiH a 
confrontation with the past is not only necessary but also 
indispensable in order to create and implement the reforms necessary 
to accede to the EU. The same principle applies to the EU itself which, 
in order to effectively intervene in BiH, has to deal with the 
consequences of the country’s past. 
The history of the BiH consists of a series of episodes of foreign 
interventions, colonization by the Ottoman, and then the Austro-
Hungarian empires, Communization, World Wars and various foreign 
interventions that may have reached its zenith with the conclusion of 
the Dayton Agreement in 1995, which ended the three-year war in 
BiH11 Nevertheless, BiH is still rife with ethnic divisions and religious 
discrimination.12 The final chapter of the war, the one that prompted 
 
10  See author’s comments in footnote 4 and Malcom (1996), infra.  
11  Noel Malcolm, “Bosnia: A short history”, NYU Press, 1996. 
12  Ibid. 
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the intervention of foreign powers was the massacre of Srebrenica, 
starting on the 16th of July 1995. After Serbian forces were almost 
faced with defeat in Croatia and BiH, by the combined attacks of the 
Croatian and NATO forces, diplomatic efforts produced the basic 
document that until today dictates the political affairs in BIH. It 
protected de jure its integrity, but enshrined de facto its almost 
partition based on ethnicity.13 
Overall, the Dayton Agreement was a critical development in the 
history of the country that confronts programmatic and policy 
interventions by the EU. 14  
It should be noted, that in 1995, when Dayton was adopted, BiH was 
a territory with no independent past upon which its future could be 
build. The medieval Bosnian state was too far away in memory. 
However, centuries of foreign domination had left a profound 
footprint in the country. BiH was a territory with no experience as a 
sovereign state;15it had no experience in diplomacy or the management 
of state institutions or in governance. In communist Yugoslavia, even 
being the most open of all communist countries, the notions of human 
rights were not implanted due to the nature of the regime and its 
ideology. On top of that, BiH, in 1995, emerged from a savage war that 
had cost 100,000 lives on Bosnian soil in just three years.16 After all the 
deaths, forced displacements and torture, abuse and violations, there 
were two competing and completely incompatible trends in BiH.  
 
13  Ibid. 
14  Richard Caplan (2000) Assessing the Dayton Accord: The structural weaknesses of 
the general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Diplomacy 
and Statecraft, 11:2, 213-232, DOI: 10.1080/09592290008406163. Last accessed 
12 November 2018. 
15  See author’s comments in footnote 4 and Malcom (1996), infra. 
16  Ibid.; Frida Ghitis, “Is Bosnia heading back to the dark old days of the 1990s?”, 
online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/05/28/ 
 is-bosnia-heading-back-to-the-dark-old-days-of-the-1990s/?utm_term=.a8c48bdf00 
 38. Last accessed 19 November 2018. 
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The Serbian population, or mostly its leaders, did not want to take part 
in any Bosnian state.17 They sought separation and wanted to join the 
Serbian Republic. The Muslims leadership within, however, wanted a 
centralized state, in which they would be dominant due to their 
demographic weight and therefore stronger representation. 18 
Simultaneously, the Croats wanted a decentralized state at best, or 
having the areas with a Croatian majority joining the recently created 
Croatian Republic.19 
From all these observations, it would seem that the framers of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, found a hostile territory to reconcile the 
parties, based on the violent recent past and a dependence on 
principles of governance that has been shaped by foreign rule. It is 
true that the DPA stopped the war and brought peace in the region. 
However, it also created a country that remained complex in regard 
to its internal ethnic divisions. It forced three antagonistic 
communities into a relationship that presented serious challenges in 
governance and especially values. This is where the EU comes in.20 
 
 
 
17  Sumantra Bose, “Untangling the Truth: The War in Bosnia,” online at: 
http://fathom.lse.ac.uk/Features/122275/; “Bosnian Genocide”, online at: https:// 
 www.history.com/topics/1990s/bosnian-genocide; Tony Barber, “The Bosnia Crisis: 
Serbs, Croats and Muslims: who hates who and why: Tony Barber in Zagreb traces 
the ancient roots of a culture clash that has shattered what was Yugoslavia into 
warring pieces”, online at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/the-bosnia-
crisis-serbs-croats-and-muslims-who-hates-who-and-why-tony-barber-in-zagreb-
traces-the-1539305.html. Last accessed 29 October 2018. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Jonathan Steele, Self-serving leaders keep Bosnia divided, online at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/apr/16/jonathansteele. Last accessed 12 
November 2018. 
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4. Today’s BiH  
With the current status of political and economic governance, BiH has 
seen slow economic development 21 and depopulation22  due to the 
effects of war and recent trends in employment and migration. 23 
BiH is a decentralized state consisting of “entities”, which include the 
Republic Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plus the 
multinational Brčko district. The Federation has 10 cantons and 80 
municipalities. 24  Article III (11) of the Dayton Accord states, “all 
governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned in this 
Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be those 
of the Entities.”25 Article III (12) further equips the presidency of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina with the “coordination power to facilitate inter-entity 
coordination on matters not responsibility of the Entities.”26 This means 
that the power of the central government is limited to only 10 
competences,27 which may be clustered into three main domains: foreign 
affairs, including international relations and representation, monetary 
policy, as well as transport regulations in its national dimensions. 28 
 
21 Online at: http://www.bhas.ba/?option=com_publikacija&id=2&lang=en. Last 
accessed 5 August 2018. 
22  Online at: https://data.worldbank.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina; 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html; 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170215-1?  
inheritRedirect=true. Last accessed 5 August 2018. 
23  Online at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina. Last accessed 
5 August 2018; Populatio grew from 3.2 million up to 4.5 between 1960 and 1988 to 
start declining from that year on. It plummeted once the war started in 1992 to reach 
a minimum of 3.75 in 1998 to a slight recovery until 2005, with 3.78. Then the decline 
started again, slightly at first, and much more marked after 2008. From 2014 on it 
continues but with much smaller figures, ranging from 30.041 between 2014-2015 to 
19.145 between 2015 and 2016. 
24  See Dayton Agreement; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Division of Powers, online at: 
https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/countries/Potential-Candidates/BAH/ 
 Pages/default.aspx. Last accessed 13 November 2018. 
25  Dayton Agreement, article III (11), online at: http://www.osce.org/bih/126173? 
download=true. Last accessed 18 July 2018. 
26   Dayton Agreement, article III (12). 
27  Dayton Agreement, article III (10). 
28  Ibid. 
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Although, essentially, BiH’s central government key powers are foreign 
affairs and monetary policies, according to Dayton.29 
A further issue lies with the country not having a common national 
social security, a central pension system,30  nationally operated or 
controlled airports, a national taxation policy, and a national police 
force or national railways. Neither does it have any power to approve 
or implement basic national policies in essential areas, including in 
education, healthcare, environment, energy, or civil infrastructure.31 
Furthermore, it does not have a national single citizenship, but 
instead a two-level citizenship – one at entity level, and one at 
national level, which supersedes the one at entity level. The issuance of 
passports is also not an exclusive power of the central state. 32 
Nevertheless, the entities have the power to “establish special parallel 
relationships with neighboring states consistent with the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.33 
5. Rule of Law in BiH  
In 2015, the World Justice Project assessed the performance of BiH 
in the domain of Rule of Law. 34  While there were promising 
developments in this area, the country has a long way to go to meet 
the demanding standard required by accession to the EU. Analyzing 
constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open 
 
29  See Dayton Agreement; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Division of Powers, online at: 
https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/countries/Potential-Candidates/BAH/ 
Pages/default.aspx. Last accessed 13 November 2018. 
30  Online at: http://journals.euser.org/files/articles/ejms_jan_apr_16_nr2/Nikolina 
pdf. Last accessed 13 July 2018. 
31  See Dayton Agreement; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Division of Powers, online at: 
https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/countries/Potential-Candidates/BAH/ 
Pages/default.aspx. Last accessed 13 November 2018. 
32  Dayton Agreement, article I (13) (e). 
33  Dayton Agreement, article III (10). 
34  “World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2015,” online at: 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/roli_2015_0.pdf. Last accessed 12 
June 2018.  
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government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory 
enforcement, civil justice, criminal justice and informal justice as 
indicators of performance.35 BiH shows a 0.50 rate in rule of law, only 
slightly better than Moldova, which scored 0.48. With ranking 40th, BiH 
occupies a better position than Bulgaria, which achieved the 45th 
position despite it having been a EU member state since 2007. It is 
closely behind FYROM, another candidate country. Croatia, another 
EU member since 2013, is in a better position, in the 35th place with 
0.60. Germany boasts a 0.81 rate and it is in 8th place. France takes 
the 18th with 0.74. If Slovenia, a former republic in Yugoslavia, 
Germany and France are benchmarks for BiH, clearly a lot of work 
still needs to be accomplished also in cooperation with the EU.36 
Current EU initiatives discussed below may further improve the 
performance of BiH. 
6. Human Rights in BiH  
In 2017, Human Rights Watch (HRW) identified the failure to resolve 
war crime cases, to amend the constitution of BiH, and to enforce the 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdić-Finci37 
 
35  Ibid.  
36  Ibid. 
37  Dervo Sejdić, of Roma ethnicity, and Jakob Finci, of Jewish ethnicity, brought a case 
to the European Court of Human Rights on the 3rd of July and the 18th of August 
2006. They complained about the impossibility for them to stand for election to the 
House of Peoples and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, positions reserved 
for members of the three constituent peoples. This landmark case shows clearly to 
what extent the Dayton Agreement, and the Constitution it created, provided for the 
protection of the rights of the peoples of BiH but left the rights of the other minorities 
unprotected and under permanent discrimination. It also shows how current 
arrangements created a two-level citizenship system, affecting directly the political 
rights of some of the citizens of BiH. The European Court of Human Rights, on the 
22nd of December 2009, ruled that “there has been a violation of Article 14 of the 
Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 as regards the 
applicants’ ineligibility to stand for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, online at:  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library= 
 eCHR&id=001-96491&. Last accessed 30 August 2018. 
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case as obstacles to genuinely addressing human rights issues in the 
country, also based on discrimination on ethnic and religious 
grounds. 38  An aspect of human rights in BiH deals with the 
consequences of the war, particularly internally displaced people 
(IDPs) and refugees. Data from the Ministry for Human Rights at the 
end of 2015 showed that there were 98,234 IDPs in BiH. 39 
Nevertheless, HRW underscored the lack of reliable information from 
BiH or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) about the repatriation of refugees. 40  
Another critical aspect is the accountability for war crimes. The most 
complex cases were supposed to be concluded by 2015. 41 However, 
346 war crime cases involving 3,383 individuals are still pending. 42 
Worse yet, in August 2016, cantonal courts and the Basic Court in 
Brćko have allowed five war crime convicts who had been sentenced 
to up to one year in prison to pay fines instead.43 In the Sejdić-Finci 
case, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, that “there has been 
a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 as regards the applicants’ ineligibility to 
stand for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.”44 In relation to this particular case, and if the EU is to 
adopt an active role in promoting the improvement of the whole 
situation of human rights in BiH, the enforcement of this decision has 
 
38  Human Rights Watch, Bosnia and Herzegovina Events of 2017, (no date), online at: 
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/bosnia-and-herzegovina. 
Last accessed 12 June 2018; Human Rights Watch, Bosnia: A Move to End 
Discrimination Minorities Side-lined in Panel to Oversee Change, November 2, 
2011, online at: http://www.hrw.org/news /2011/11/02/bosnia-move-end-
discrimination. Last accessed 30 June 2018. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid; see also, Human Rights Watch, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Country Summary, 
January 2017, online at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/bosnia_3.pdf. Last 
accessed 30 June 2018.  
43  Ibid. 
44  Online at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=eCHR&id=001- 
96491&. Last accessed 22 August 2018. 
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to be promoted during the accession negotiations in order to 
amendment the basic law and to reflect the ruling laid down by the 
European Court. Nevertheless, the EU dropped the implementation of 
the 2009 European Court ruling as a condition for the entry into force 
of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), thus possibly 
weakening a key instrument to improve the human rights situation in 
a post-war scenario.45 Nevertheless, mechanisms remain within the 
SAA that may be used to insist on the enforcement of the decision. 
Accordingly, the European Commission observed in its 2018 Report 
on BiH that its constitution “remains in breach of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as per the Sejdić-Finci and related 
cases.”46 
7. Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)  
The SAA has been described as a long-term “integrationist approach 
to the [Western Balkans] region”.47 The SAA entered into force on 
the 1st of June, 2015.48 Its objective is to bring about needed reforms 
in the areas of the economy, the rule of law and good governance49in 
order to prepare the country for accession.50 Furthermore, it provides 
 
45  Human Rights Watch (2017). 
46  “Key findings of the 2018 Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina,” online at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-3408_en.htm. Last accessed 17 
April 2018. 
47  Claire Gordon, Gwendolyn Sasse, Sofia Sebastian, “Specific report on the EU 
policies in the Stabilisation and Association process,” online at: 
http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/autonomies/minrig/Documents/Mirico/24_SA
P.pdf. Last accessed 29 August 2018. 
48  Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina enters 
into force today, European Commission, Press Release, June 1, 2015, online at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5086_en.htm. Last accessed 12 June 
2018. 
49  “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Conclusion of Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement,” online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/  
2015/04/21/bih-conclusion-stabilisation-association-agreement/. Last accessed 
12 June 2018. 
50  See IPA II, infra. 
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mechanisms to ensure that changes in the institutions will be achieved 
over time. This is confirmed by the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA).51 SAA`s goals such as supporting “the efforts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to strengthen democracy and the rule of law” 
and contributing “to political, economic and institutional stability in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to the stabilization of the region” 
are particularly applicable. Furthermore, the preamble to the SAA 
provides the context for its implementation. There, two clauses 
underline the need for “political, economic and institutional 
stabilization” and the commitment to respect human rights and the 
rule of law.52 
Recently, the Commission has reported on the implementation of the 
SAA within BiH.53 While it recognized that progress has been made, 
it also observed that the pace was slow and that institutions, notably 
in the area of human rights need to be further improved.54 Widespread 
corruption and the lack of progress of reforming public administration 
were also identified as problem areas, which need to be addressed. 
The Commission has therefore called on BiH to “adopt and start 
implementation of a new country-wide strategic framework for public 
administration reform” 55 and to “adopt a national program for legal 
approximation with the EU acquis.”56 Furthermore, a countrywide 
 
51  Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II) 2014-2020, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Enhanced Justice Sector and cooperation in Rule of Law, online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/bosnia_and_ 
 herzegovina/ipa/ 2015/ipa_2015-037888.05-bih-enhanced_justice_sector_and_ 
 cooperation_in_rule_of_law.pdf [IPA II]. Last accessed 12 June 2018. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Commission Staff Working Document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018 Report 
Accompanying the document, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement 
Policy {COM(2018) 450 final}, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-bosnia-and-herzegovin a-report.pdf. Last 
accessed 28 August 2018. 
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid. 
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strategy for human rights and the adoption of an anti-discrimination 
program were highlighted as goals.57 That the Republic Srpska still 
has to repeal the death penalty from its constitution was also pointed 
out by the Commission.58 
8. EU Initiatives on the Rule of Law and Human Rights  
The EU announced the revised Strategy Paper for BiH for the 2018-
2020 period of the IPA II funds with a total budget of €314.9 million.59 
It includes, among the different packages, “support in the rule of law 
sector [that] will further improve access to justice for all citizens” and 
“support [for] further reforms to ensure protection of fundamental 
rights, in particular of the most vulnerable groups, including Roma 
and refugees and internally displaced persons”.60 
Current EU efforts in BiH consist of the implementation of various 
projects. The main instruments that are used are the IPA and the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). 
Furthermore, the EU is also the biggest donor to BiH and was reported 
to provide €3.2 billion worth of funding between 1991-2013 for 
projects in the areas of “post-conflict reconstruction to rule of law, 
public administration reform, social and economic development, 
demining and ammunition destruction, environment, agriculture, civil 
society, and cross-border cooperation”.61 
  
 
57  Ibid. 
58  Ibid. 
59  “More than 300 million Euro of pre-accession aid planned or BiH for 2018-2020,” 
online at: https://euinfo.ba/en/article/more-than-300-million-euro-of-pre- 
 accession-aid-planned-for-bih-for-2018-2020/9550. Last accessed 1 August 
2018. 
60  Ibid. 
61  “Grant contracts awarded during December 2016 and February 2017,” online at: 
http://europa.ba/?page_id=682. Last accessed 28 August 2018. 
Javier González López 
14 
 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance. This instrument is used by 
the EU to promote the rule of law and human rights in a country being 
considered for accession. In 2015, the EU, adopted the IPA II to be 
implemented in BiH from 2014 to 2020, based on the following rule 
of law issues62: 
• Insufficient efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and 
accountability of the judicial / prosecutorial institutions, including 
their mutual-cooperation with law enforcement agencies; 
• Inadequate infrastructure and equipment conditions of institutes 
for the execution of criminal sanctions throughout BiH; 
• Inadequate infrastructure and equipment conditions of courts and 
prosecutor’s offices throughout BiH. 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. Another 
instrument used by the EU in promoting human rights in third 
countries is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR). As of 2016, projects on engagement of schools and 
student councils, tobacco control, and access to drinking water were 
reported to have been financed by the EU.63 
9. Other Initiatives by the UN Development Program 
and OECD  
The projects of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) also focus on improving the rule of law. Just 
like the EU, the initiatives pertain to enhancing the independence of 
the judiciary and prosecutors to make sure that war crimes and other 
human rights cases would be effectively handled. Corruption in BiH 
 
62  IPA II. 
63  “Grant contracts awarded,” supra [Objectives are direct quotes from the table 
available in the website], online at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/
 eidhr_en.htm_en. Last accessed 8 November 2018. 
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has also been a concern for the organization.64 In the area of human 
ights, it has also focused on housing projects, while assisting the 
Ombudsman in handling discrimination cases to ensure compliance with 
international standards. Capacity-building of human rights advocates is 
also a component of its mission.65 
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has implemented 
several development projects in BiH. They relate directly to the issues it 
identified in a research conducted in cooperation with the EU, “the Socio-
economic perceptions of young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. 
66Perceptions on “political awareness and activism, mobility and EU 
accession” were among the lines of inquiry adopted in the research.67 
With a sample consisting of 1200 correspondents and focus group reports 
in Mostar, Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Brčko, it was found out that young 
people in between the ages of 15-30 years in BiH, perceive that nothing 
has changed in the country for the past two years, and that accession to 
the EU promises employment.68 
It must be noted that it is not the first time that the UN and the EU worked 
together in addressing problems in BiH. The United Nations Mission in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, established by the Security Council in 
December 1995 to ensure the rule of law in the post-conflict and war-
torn BiH turned over its work to the European Union Police Mission on 
1 January 2003.69 
 
64  “Rule of Law,” online at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-
herzegovina/rule-of-law. Last accessed 12 June 2018. 
65  “Human Rights,” online at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-
herzegovina/human-rights. Last accessed 12 June 2018. 
66  Bosnia and Herzegovina,” online at: http://www.ba.undp.org/content/bosnia_ 
 and_herzegovina/en/home.html. Last accessed 27 August 2018. 
67  Ibid. 
68  “Socio-economic Perceptions of Young People in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
online at: http://www.ba.undp.org/content/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/ 
library/publications/young-p e ople-in-bih-share-their-socio-economic-
perceptions-and-e.html. Last accessed 27 August 2018. 
69  “Bosnia and Herzegovina – UNMIBH-Background,” online at: http:// 
peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmibh/background.html. Last accessed 12 
June 2018. 
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10. Opportunities for EU Action  
The EU has invested a significant amount of resources in its attempt 
to bring about reforms in BiH. Nonetheless, there are areas of 
improvement that should be further explored and pursued. This 
includes the formulation of a broader rule of law initiative that would 
encompass legislative and executive functions, and the enforcement 
of accountability of public officials. Another area of improvement 
would be the coordination of initiatives with other international 
organizations that have been working in BiH. Synergies with the 
OECD and the UN should be explored and taken advantage of. This is 
not a novelty as it has been done in the past and still continues to this 
day. This would prevent inconsistent approaches and would lead to 
the formation of a more holistic and solid front necessary to brave the 
challenging political landscape in the country. 
11. Influencing the Path: EU and other International 
Organizations  
Path creation presupposes a path that is followed by BiH.70 Through 
its programmatic interventions, the EU is seeking to influence the 
path followed by BiH, which was institutionalized in the Dayton 
Agreement. 
The opportunity for path creation now being opened may be taken 
advantage of by the EU with the help of the international community. 
In the past the international community already supported the 
development of the country through the endorsement and logistical 
support of the referendum in BiH, which was held in 1992. Despite 
many flaws in its implementation, the Serbian boycott, a clear 
 
70  Labiba Sheikh and Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Jadoon, “Path dependency and Path 
Creation: Exploring the Possibility of Integration”, online at: http://www.wiwiss. 
fu-berlin.de/forschung/pfadkolleg/Archiv/_NEU_Veranstaltungen/konferenzen/ 
download_center_2011/papers/Iqbal Mohammad.pdf. Last accessed 23 August 
2018. 
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majority voted in the referendum in favor of independence from 
Yugoslavia. Now BiH is looking for a further expression of support – 
a strong EU presence in the Balkans, the EU leading the way. 
Taking into account that historical decision, both internally and 
externally, and the deep involvement on the side of the USA, the EU 
and the UN, it is clear that the opportunity for path creation could 
again be seized upon in order to make the Dayton Framework evolve, 
eventually amend BiH’s constitution and conclude the stabilization 
process.  
For this to be successful, progress in regard to the rule of law should 
not merely focus on enhancing the independence of the judiciary, 
including more cases actually being heard 71  but also, the 
improvement of law enforcement, including adjustment of local 
policies and processes to the acquis. Programs should not be merely 
reactive but future oriented. 72  Under the leadership of the EU, 
stabilization – a key element of security in the Union – can be fully 
implemented. One single institution, however, cannot direct the entire 
process alone. It must be a shared endeavor. The Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) in BiH, the UN, the OECD, as well as other 
international organizations that are working in the region and the EU 
 
71  International Crisis Group, “Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion 
and Discrimination in a Post-Communist Bureaucracy,” December 15, 1999, 
online at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/rule-of-law-in-public-
administration.pdf. Last accessed 1 August 2018. In this regard, the following 
observation is relevant: In BiH relatively few people come into contact with a 
court of law. In contrast, the system of public administration sees a constant flow 
of individuals through its various layers. Whether obtaining birth certificates or 
identity papers, registering a car or attempting to acquire permits and certificates 
required by the complex BiH administrative system, virtually all BiH citizens 
queue in front of municipal and cantonal officials at some point. It is there that 
the citizenry and government meet, and it is there that the vast majority of legal 
abuses occur, as government officials – protected by a wall of seemingly 
incomprehensible laws and regulations – intimidate ordinary people. Public 
administration in BiH is a labyrinth of pre-war, wartime and post-war institutions, 
often exercising overlapping administrative authority. 
72  See, Leo Katz, “A Theory of Loopholes,” The Journal of Legal Studies 39, no. 1 
(2010): 1-31. doi:10.1086/649046. 
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(through the SAA) must cooperate closely to realize the objectives of 
stabilization, reform and eventually accession. 
Influencing the future of BiH also requires further resource allocation. 
Apart from being its biggest trading partner, the EU is also the largest 
provider of financial assistance to BiH.73 With the accession process 
receiving new wind in recent months, it can be expected that the EU 
will assume more and more financial responsibility in the future. In 
the light of High Representative Mogherini’s pronouncement, the EU 
is going to speed up all the current processes to bring BiH into the EU 
in the next few years. That means, in terms of the rule of law, that the 
EU will have to support the authorities in BiH to realize the following 
reforms: 
• implementation without delay of the Sejdić-Finci ruling from 
2009; 
• speeding up the resolution of pending war cases in the national 
courts;  
• accelerating the return of internally displaced people; 
• advancing the constitutional amendment to guarantee equal rights 
of all citizens, without differentiation between constituent peoples and 
other minorities; 
• providing a functioning legal system that is rooted on citizenship rather 
than ethnicity, and democratic representation across all ethnic lines, in 
line with the EU system. 
  
 
73  Online at: http://europa.ba/?page_id=558. Last accessed October 21, 2018. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: a Case Study for the Unfinished EU 
Agenda in the Western Balkans 
19 
 
12. EU Intervention in BiH  
The engagement of the EU in the area of rule of law and human rights 
can still be further improved by strategically addressing key issues 
that would bring lasting change in BiH. In the area of human rights, 
it would be important to address the issue of discrimination based on 
ethnicity. This issue cuts across the country and could be moved 
forward through the enforcement of the Sejdić-Finci case, which 
could potentially challenge the institutional structures in BiH. 
Furthermore, such development could provide more space for the 
Dayton Agreement to evolve or to be reviewed and for the institutions 
established pursuant to it be developed further in alignment with the 
country´s goals. The fact that it was dropped as a condition for the 
conclusion of the SAA in 2015 does not militate against the EU 
considering that the instrument itself is full of references to human 
rights, the value of the individual, and freedom from discrimination. 
In terms of legitimacy, it may even be validly argued that the Sejdić-
Finci ruling possesses more weight considering that the European 
Court of Human Rights handed down the jurisdiction to trial such 
case. In the area of the rule of law, the EU must not limit itself to 
strengthening the judiciary. It is true that a strong and independent 
judiciary is essential for a democracy. However, legislative and 
executive (or administrative) activities should likewise be closely 
examined as they provide the basis for the interpretive and 
adjudicative role of the judiciary. 
The SAA also provides the following mechanisms to realize its stated 
objectives that are geared towards realizing reforms in BiH: 
following-up on compliance (Article 8), political dialogue (Article 
10), approximation of laws (Article 70), and cooperation on public 
administration reform (Article 111). The instrument is replete with 
mechanisms to influence policies and the overall institutional 
framework for the rule of law and human rights in BiH. The EU has at 
its disposal measures to ensure that the continued engagement in BiH 
will deliver specific results. The strength of the mechanisms lies with 
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its capacities of dispute resolution and the enforcement of the 
provisions of the SAA. Furthermore, the subject matter that may be 
covered, particularly by “compliance follow-up” in Article 8, is 
phrased wide enough to encompass changing definitions of rule of 
law and human rights. 
It should, however, not be forgotten that there is and always will be a 
delicate balancing of interests in EU-BiH relations. Nevertheless, the 
reality is that the SAA, signed by BiH, allows the parties to use the 
mechanisms enshrined to accomplish the objectives of the Agreement. 
The SAA continues to be a binding instrument between the EU and BiH. 
For this reason, it can be effectively used to go around the limitations 
created by prior policy decisions and local preferences. This provides 
another perspective on how to make the engagement of the EU in BiH 
more meaningful and strategic in the transformation process. 
13. Conclusion  
Moving forward, the EU will have to make its weight in all possible 
ways felt. It will have to continue its “carrots and sticks” approach to 
demand that local elites cooperate to affect changes to the 
constitution, to implement the European Charter of Human Rights and 
the acquis communautaire in all legal fields, to respect all rulings 
from the European Court of Human Rights and to promote a true 
reconciliation based on justice for all victims of the war. It will also 
have to keep cooperating with international organizations, which have 
gathered a vast amount of knowledge on the realities of the country in 
recent years. 
Moreover, the EU must continue to work on multiple levels. BiH`s 
population will see the EU at work only if it can feel the effects of the 
projects that are being implemented, if the political situation improves 
and the economy starts to provide them with more opportunities and a 
functional administration. Any project endorsed and supported by the 
EU that help solve the situations of those displaced, as well as 
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accelerating the resolution of pending cases will create a direct impact 
on the population. BiH has been ruled from outside, and from beyond 
its borders. It needs to develop as a self-ruling political entity.  
Hopefully, the EU will be the leading political and historical entity in 
charge of helping this small country battered by history into the path 
of stability, prosperity and above all, peace. Winston Churchill said 
in one of his famous quotes: “The Balkans have produced more 
history than they can consume.” 74  The EU, BiH and other 
international organizations involved need to work together to produce 
lasting results once and for all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74  Online at: https://historia-europa.ep.eu/sites/default/files/files/event/programme_ 
 consuming_balkan_history_ final_2017.pdf. Last accessed August 28, 2018. 
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